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ABSTRACT
Non-profits and the media claim there is a radicalization pipeline
on YouTube. Its content creators would sponsor fringe ideas, and
its recommender system would steer users towards edgier content.
Yet, the supporting evidence for this claim is mostly anecdotal, and
there are no proper measurements of the influence of YouTube’s
recommender system. In this work, we conduct a large scale audit
of user radicalization on YouTube. We analyze 331, 849 videos of
360 channels which we broadly classify into: control, the Alt-lite,
the Intellectual Dark Web (I.D.W.), and the Alt-right —channels in
the I.D.W. and the Alt-lite would be gateways to fringe far-right
ideology, here represented by Alt-right channels. Processing more
than 79M comments, we show that the three communities increas-
ingly share the same user base; that users consistently migrate
from milder to more extreme content; and that a large percentage
of users who consume Alt-right content now consumed Alt-lite and
I.D.W. content in the past. We also probe YouTube’s recommenda-
tion algorithm, looking at more than 2M million recommendations
for videos and channels between May and July 2019. We find that
Alt-lite content is easily reachable from I.D.W. channels via recom-
mendations and that Alt-right channels may be reached from both
I.D.W. and Alt-lite channels. Overall, we paint a comprehensive
picture of user radicalization on YouTube and provide methods to
transparently audit the platform and its recommender system.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Human-centered computing→Empirical studies in collab-
orative and social computing.
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1 INTRODUCTION
On YouTube, channels that discuss social, political and cultural sub-
jects have flourished. Among them, one may find individuals such
as Jordan Peterson and Joe Rogan, associated with the so-called
Intellectual Dark Web (I.D.W.) —iconoclastic thinkers, academics
and media personalities [43]— but also openly declared white na-
tionalists like Richard Spencer and Jared Taylor, which have been
broadly referred to as Alt-right [5].
These individuals do not only share the same platform, but often
publicly engage in debates and conversations on the website [25].
All the previously mentioned individuals, for example, are con-
nected by joint video appearances: Jordan Peterson was interviewed
by Joe Rogan [34], who interviewed YouTuber Carl Benjamin [35],
who debated Richard Spencer [8], who was in a panel with Jared
Taylor in an Alt-right conference [36]. According to Lewis [25],
this proximity would create “radicalization pathways” for audi-
ence members and content creators. Anecdotal examples of these
journeys are plenty, including Roosh V ’s content creator trajectory,
going from a Pick Up Artist to Alt-right supporter [24, 38], and
Caleb Cain’s testimony of his YouTube-driven radicalization [37].
The claim that there is a “radicalization pipeline” on YouTube
should be considered in the context of decreasing trust in main-
stream media and increasing influence of social networks. Across
the globe, individuals are skeptical of traditional media vehicles
and growingly consume news and opinion content on social me-
dia [22, 31]. In this setting, recent research has shown that fringe
websites (like 4chan) and subreddits (like /r/TheDonald) have great
influence over which memes [44] and news [45] are shared in large
social networks, such as Twitter. YouTube is extremely popular,
especially among children and teenagers [7], and, if the streaming
website is actually radicalizing individuals, this can push fringe
ideologies like white supremacy further into the mainstream [42].
A key issue in dealing with topics like radicalization and hate
speech is the lack of agreement over what is “hateful” or “ex-
treme” [39]. A work-around is to perform community-based anal-
yses, rather than trying to label what is or is not hateful. For the
purpose of this work, we consider three communities that have
been associated with user radicalization [25, 37, 43], and that differ
in the extremity of their content: the Intellectual Dark Web (I.D.W.),
the Alt-lite and the Alt-right. While the I.D.W. discuss controversial
subjects like race and I.Q. [43], the Alt-right sponsor fringe ideas
like that of a white ethnostate [19]. Somewhere in the middle, indi-
viduals of the Alt-lite deny to embrace white supremacist ideology,
although they constantly flirt with concepts associated with it (e.g.,
the great replacement, globalist conspiracies, etc.).
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Present Work. In this paper, we audit whether users are indeed
becoming radicalized on YouTube, and whether the recommenda-
tion algorithms contribute towards this radicalization. We do so by
examining three proeminent communities: the Intellectual Dark
Web, the Alt-lite and the Alt-right. More specifically, considering
Alt-right content as a proxy for extreme content, we ask:
RQ1 How was the growth of these communities on YouTube in
the last decade?
RQ2 To which extent do users systematically gravitate towards
more extreme content?
RQ3 Do algorithmic recommendations steer users towards more
extreme content?
We develop a data collection process where we (i) acquire a large
pool of relevant channels from these communities; (ii) collect meta-
data and comments for each of the videos in the channels; (iii) an-
notate channels as belonging to several different communities; and
(iv) collect YouTube video and channel recommendations. We addi-
tionally collect traditional and alternative media channels to employ
as control. Notice that we use these as a sanity check to capture
the growth of similar content on YouTube, rather than trying to
obtain similar users in other channels. These efforts resulted in a
dataset with more than 79 million comments in 331, 849 videos of
360 channels, and with more than 2M video and 10k channel rec-
ommendations. Importantly, our recommendations do not account
for personalization. We analyse this large dataset extensively:
• We look at the growth of the I.D.W., the Alt-lite and the Alt-
right throughout the last decade in terms of videos, likes and
views, finding a steep rise in activity and engagement in the
communities of interest when compared with the control chan-
nels. Moreover, comments per view seem to be particularly
high in more extreme content, reaching near to 1 comment for
each 5 views in Alt-right channels (Sec. 4).
• In that scenario, we inspect the intersection of commenting
users within the communities, finding they increasingly share
the same user base. Analyzing the overlap coefficient of the
sets of commenting users, we find that more than half of users
who commented on Alt-right channels in 2018 also comment
on Alt-lite and on I.D.W. channels (Sec. 5).
• We also find that the intersection is not only growing due to
new users but that there is significant user migration among
the communities being studied. Users that initially comment
only on content from the I.D.W. or the Alt-lite throughout the
years consistently start to comment onAlt-right content. These
users are a significant fraction of the Alt-right commenting
user base. Interestingly, although control channels share, on
a yearly basis, a significant number of users with Alt-right
channels, we cannot observe significant user migration from
them to Alt-right channels (Sec. 6).
• Lastly, we take a look on the impact of YouTube’s recommen-
dation algorithms, running simulations on recommendation
graphs. Our analyses show that, particularly through the chan-
nel recommender system, Alt-lite channels are easily discov-
ered from I.D.W. channels, and that Alt-right channels may be
reached from the two other communities (Sec. 7).
This is, to our best knowledge, the first large scale quantitative
audit of user radicalization on YouTube. We find strong evidence
for radicalization among YouTube users, and that YouTube’s recom-
mender system enables Alt-right channels to be discovered, even
in a scenario without personalization. We discuss our findings and
our limitations in light of the research questions further in Sec. 8.
We argue that commenting users are a good enough proxy to mea-
sure the phenomena, as more extreme content seems to beget more
comments. Moreover, regardless of the degree of influence of the
recommender system in the process of radicalizing users, there is
significant evidence that this process is happening, and that appro-
priate measures should be taken.
2 BACKGROUND
Contrarian Communities.We discuss three of YouTube’s promi-
nent communities: the Intellectual Dark Web, the Alt-lite and the
Alt-right. We argue that all of them are contrarians, in the sense that
they strongly oppose mainstream views or attitudes. According
to Nagle, these communities flourished in the wave of “anti-PC”
culture of the 2010s, where social-political movements (e.g. the
transgender rights movement, the anti-sexual assault movement)
were portrayed as hysterical, and their claims, as absurd [30].
According the Anti Defamation League [5], the Alt-Right is a
loose segment of the white supremacist movement consisting of
individuals who reject mainstream conservatism in favor of politics
that embrace racist, anti-Semitic and white supremacist ideology.
The Alt-right skews younger than other far right groups, and has
a big online presence, particularly on fringe web sites like 4chan,
8chan and certain corners of Reddit [1].
The term Alt-lite was created to differentiate right-wing activists
who deny to embracing white supremacist ideology. Atkison argues
that the Unite the Rally in Charlotesville was deeply related to
this change, as participants of the rally revealed the movement’s
white supremacist leanings and affiliations [10]. Alt-right writer
and white supremacist Greg Johnson [5] describes the difference
between Alt-right and Alt-lite by the origin of it’s nationalism:
"The Alt-lite is defined by civic nationalism as opposed to racial
nationalism, which is a defining characteristic of the Alt-right". This
distinction was also highlighted in [28]. Yet it is important to point
out that the line between the Alt-right and the Alt-lite is blurry [5],
as many Alt-liters are accused of dog-whistling: attenuating their
real beliefs to appeal to a more general public and to prevent getting
banned [23, 26]. To address this problem, in this paper we take a
very conservative approach to our labeling, naming only the most
extreme content creators as Alt-right. This is explained in further
detail in Sec. 3.
The Intellectual Dark Web (I.D.W.) is a term coined by Eric Ross
Weinstein to refer to a particular group of academics and podcast
hosts. The neologism was later popularized in a New York Times
opinion article [43], where it is employed to describe: "collection
of iconoclastic thinkers, academic renegades and media personalities
who are having a rolling conversation about all sorts of subjects, (...)
touching on controversial issues such as abortion, biological differences
between men and women, identity politics, religion, immigration, etc".
The group described in the NYT piece includes Sam Harris, Jor-
dan Peterson, Ben Shapiro, Dave Rubin and Joe Rogan, and also
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mentions a website with an unofficial list of members. Members of
the so-called I.D.W have been accused of bigotry, including Islamo-
phobia [11], transphobia [4] and sexism [17]. Moreover, a recent
report by Data & Society research institute has claimed these chan-
nels are “pathways to radicalization” [25]: theywould act as an entry
point to more radical channels, such as those in Alt-right. Broadly,
members of this loosely defined movement see these critics as a
consequence of discussing controversial subjects [43] and largely
ignored/dismissed the report [41]. Similarly to what happens be-
tween Alt-right and Alt-lite, there is also blurry lines between the
I.D.W. and the Alt-lite, especially for non-core members, like those
listed in the website. Here, again, we take a conservative approach,
considering borderline cases to belong to the Alt-lite.
Radicalization. We approach this central concept with the def-
inition of McCauley and Moskalenko [29]: Functionally, political
radicalization is increased preparation for and commitment to inter-
group conflict. Descriptively, radicalization means change in beliefs,
feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify inter-
group violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the ingroup. We
use the consumption of Alt-right content as a proxy for radical-
ization. We argue this is reasonable because the rhetoric preached
by the Alt-right has been associated with multiple recent terrorist
attacks (e.g. the Christchurch mass shooting [27]), and because it
champions ideas associated with intergroup conflict (e.g. a white
ethnostate [19]). Our conservative strategy when labeling channels
is of particular importance here: Alt-right channels are closely re-
lated to these ideas, while the Alt-lite and the I.D.W. are given the
benefit of the doubt.
Auditing the web. As algorithms play an ever-larger role in our
lives, it is increasingly important for researchers and society at large
to reverse engineer algorithms input-output relationships [15]. Pre-
vious large scale algorithmic auditing include measuring discrimi-
nation on AirBnB [16], personalization onweb search [20] and price
discrimination on e-commerce web sites [21]. We argue this work
is an audit in the sense that is measures a troublesome phenom-
ena (user radicalization) in a content-sharing social environment
heavily influenced by algorithms (YouTube). Unfortunately, it is
impossible to obtain the entire history of YouTube recommendation,
so we must limit algorithmic analyses to a time slice of a constantly
changing black-box. Although comments may give us insight into
the past, its impossible to tease apart the influence of the algorithm
in previous times. Another limitation of our auditing is that we do
not account for user personalization. Despite these flaws, we argue
that: (i) our analyses provide answers to important questions re-
lated with impactful societal processes that are allegedly happening
in YouTube, and (ii) our framework for auditing user radicalization
can be replicated through time, and expanded to handle personal-
ization. Regardless of the extent of the contribution of YouTube’s
algorithm towards the process of user radicalization, understanding
this process and finding ways to fight it is still a timely question.
Previous research from/on YouTube. Previous work by Google
sheds light into some of the high-level technicalities of YouTube’s
recommender system [13, 14]. Their latest paper indicates they
use feed embeddings for video searches and video histories into a
dense feed-forward neural network [14]. There also exists a large
body of work studying violent [18], hateful or extremist [6, 40]
and disturbing content [33] on the platform. Much of the existing
work focus on creating detection algorithms for these types of con-
tent using features of the comments, the commenting users and
the videos [6, 18]. Notably, Sureka et al. [40] use a seed-expanding
methodology to track extremist user communities, which yielded
high precision in including relevant users. This is somewhat anal-
ogous to what we do, although we use YouTube’s recommender
system while they use user friends, subscriptions and favourites.
Ottoni et al. perform an in-depth textual analysis of 23 channels (13
broadly defined as Alt-right), finding significantly different topics
across the two groups [32].
3 DATA COLLECTION
We are interested in three communities on YouTube: the I.D.W., the
Alt-lite, and the Alt-right. Identifying such communities and the
channels which belong to them is no easy task: the membership of
channels to these communities is volatile and fuzzy, and there is
disagreement between how members of these communities view
themselves, and how they are considered by scholars and the media.
These particularities make our challengemulti-faceted: on one hand,
we want to study user radicalization, and determine, for example,
if users who start watching videos by communities like the I.D.W.
eventually go on to consume Alt-right content. On the other, there
is often no clear agreement on who belongs to which community.
Due to these nuances, we devise a careful methodology to (a) col-
lect a large pool of relevant channels; (b) collect data and the rec-
ommendations given by YouTube for these channels; (c) manually
labeling these channels according to the communities of interest.
(a) For each community, we create a pool of channels as follows.
We refer to channels obtained in the i-th step as Type i channels.
(1) We choose a set of seed channels. Seeds were extracted from the
I.D.W. unofficial website [9], Anti Defamation League’s report
on the Alt-lite/the Alt-right [5] and Data & Society’s report on
YouTube Radicalization [25]. We pick popular channels that
are representative of the community we are interested at. Each
seed was independently annotated two times and discarded
in case there was any disagreement. We further detail the
annotation process later in this section.
(2) We choose a set of keywords related to the sub-communities.
For each keyword, we use YouTube’s search functionality and
consider the first 200 results in English. We then add channels
that broadly relate in topic to the community in question. For
example, for the Alt-right, keywords included both terms asso-
ciated with their narratives, such as The Jewish Question and
White Genocide, as well as the names or nicknames of famous
Alt-righters, such as weev and Christopher Cantwell.
(3) We iteratively search the related and featured channels col-
lected in steps (1) and (2), adding relevant channels (as defined
in 2). Note that these are two ways channel can link to each
other. Featured channels may be chosen by YouTube content
creators: if your friend has a channel and you want to support
it, you can put it on your "Featured Channels" tab. Related chan-
nels are recommendations made by YouTube’s recommender
system.
(4) We repeat step (3), iteratively collecting another hop of fea-
tured/recommended channels from those obtained from 3.
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Table 1: Top 16 YouTube channels with the most views per each community and for controls.
Alt-right Views Alt-lite Views Intellectual Dark Web Views Control Views
1 James Allsup 62M StevenCrowder 727M PowerfulJRE 1B vox 1B
2 Black Pigeon Speaks 50M Rebel Media 405M JRE Clips 717M gq magazine 1B
3 ThuleanPerspective 45M Paul Joseph Watson 356M PragerUniversity 635M vice news 1B
4 Red Ice TV 42M MarkDice 334M SargonofAkkad100 258M wired magazine 1B
5 The Golden One 12M Stefan Molyneux 193M The Daily Wire 247M vanity fair 639M
6 AmRenVideos 9M hOrnsticles3 145M The Rubin Report 206M the verge 636M
7 NeatoBurrito Productions 7M MILO 133M ReasonTV 138M glamour magazine 620M
8 The Last Stand 7M Styxhexenhammer666 132M JordanPetersonVideos 90M business insider 523M
9 MillennialWoes 6M OneTruth4Life 112M Bite-sized Philosophy 62M huffington post (huffpost) 329M
10 Mark Collett 6M No Bullshit 104M Owen Benjamin 35M today i found out 328M
11 AustralianRealist 5M SJWCentral 90M AgatanFoundation 33M cbc news 324M
12 Jean-François Gariépy 5M Computing Forever 87M Essential Truth 32M the guardian 300M
13 Prince of Zimbabwe 5M The Thinkery 86M Ben Shapiro 30M people magazine 287M
14 The Alternative Hypothesis 5M Bearing 81M YAFTV 30M big think 258M
15 Matthew North 4M RobinHoodUKIP 64M joerogandotnet 25M cosmopolitan 256M
16 Faith J Goldy 4M patcondell 64M TheArchangel911 24M global news 252M
The annotation process done here followed the same instructions as
the one explained in detail for data collection step (c). Steps (2)—(4),
were done by an individual with more than 50 hours of watch-time
of the communities of interest. Notice that, in steps (2)—(4), we
are not labeling the channels, but creating a pool of channels to be
further inspected and labeled in subsequent steps. The complete
list of seeds obtained from (1) and of keywords used in (2) may
be found in Appendix A. A clear distinction between featured and
recommended channels may be found in Appendix B
(b) For each channel we collect the number of subscribers and views,
and for their videos, all the comments and captions. Video and
channel recommendations were collected separately using custom-
made crawlers. We collected multiple "rounds" of recommendations,
22 for channel recommendations and 19 for video recommendations.
Each "round" consists of collecting all recommended channels (on
the channel web page) and all recommended video (on the video
web page). To circumvent possible location bias in the data we
collected we used VPNs from 7 different locations: 3 in the USA,
2 in Canada, 1 in Switzerland and 1 in Brazil. Moreover, channels
were always visited in random order, to prevent any biases from
arising from session-based recommendations. As we extensively
discuss throughout the paper, this does not include personalization,
as we do not log in into any account.
(c) Channel labeling was done in multiple steps. All channels are
either seeds (Type 1) or obtained through YouTube’s recommenda-
tion/search engine (Types 2 and 3). Notice that Type 1 channels were
assigned labels at the time of their collection. For the others, we had
2 researchers annotate them carefully. They both had significant
experience with the communities being studied, and were given
the following instructions:
Carefully inspect each one of the channels in this table, taking a
look at the most popular videos, and watching, altogether, at least
5 minutes of content from that channel. Then you should decide
if the channel belongs to the Alt-right, the Alt-lite, the Intellectual
Dark Web (I.D.W.), or whether you think it doesn’t fit any of the
communities. To get a grasp on who belongs to the I.D.W., read [43],
and check out the website with some of the alleged members of the
group [9]. Yet, we ask you to consider the label holistically, including
channels that have content from these creators and with a similar
spirit to also belong in this category. To distinguish between the
Alt-right and the Alt-lite, read [5] and [28]. It is important to stress
the difference between civic nationalism and racial nationalism in
that case. Please consider the Alt-right label only to the most extreme
content. You are encouraged to search on the internet for the name
of the content creator to help you make your decision.
The annotation process lasted for 3 weeks. In case they disagreed,
they had to discuss the cases individually until a conclusion was
reached. Interanotator agreement was of 75.57%. We ended up with
90 I.D.W., 114 Alt-lite and 88 Alt-right channels.
Controls. Additionally we collect popular media channels as con-
trols. These were obtained from themediabiasfactcheck.com [3]. For
each media source of the categories in the website (Left, Left-Center,
Center, Right-Center, Right) we search for its name on YouTube, and
consider it if there is a match in the first page of results [3]. Some
of the channels were not considered because they had too many
videos (15, 000+) and we were not able to retrieve them all (which
is important, because our analysis are temporal). In total, we collect
68 channels in that way. Notice that although we name this group
as control throughout the paper, we did not attempt to replicate
the distribution of users w.r.t. some aspect in the communities of
interest. We use these control channels as a sanity check to capture
general trends among more mainstream YouTube channels.
We summarize the dataset collected in the Tab. 2. Data collection
was performed from the 19th to the 30th of May 2019, and the
collection of the recommendations between May and July 2019. We
illustrate the difference between video and channel recommenda-
tions, and provide the full list of channel with raw labels, as well as
seed channels and keywords used in Appendix A.
Table 2: Overview of our dataset.
Channels 360 Video Recs rounds 19
Videos 331, 849 Video Recs 2,474,044
Comments 79,180,534 Channel Recs Rounds 22
Commenting users 6,308,759 Channel Recs 14,283
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Figure 1: On the top row (a)—(e), for each community and controls, we have the cumulative number of active channels (that
posted at least one video), of videos published, of likes, views and of comments. In the bottom row, we have CDFs for engage-
ment metrics, and the CCDF of videos published, zoomed in in the range [40%, 100%] on the y-axis. Notice that for comments,
we know only the year when they were published, and thus the CDFs granularity is coarser (years rather than seconds). The
raw numbers of views, likes, videos published and more is shown in App. C.
4 THE RISE OF CONTRARIANS
We present an overview of the channels in the communities of
interest, and show results about their growth in the last years,
setting the stage to more in-depth analyses in later sections. Tab. 1
shows the 16 most viewed YouTubers for each of the communities
and for the controls, and Figure 1 shows information on the number
of videos published, channels created, likes, views and comments
per year, as well as several engagement metrics.
Recent rise in activity. Figs. 1(a)—(e) show the rise in channel
creation, video publishing, likes, views and comments in the last
decade. The four latter are growing exponentially for all the com-
munities of interest and for the control channels. Noticeably, the
rise in the number of active channels is much more recent for the
communities of interest than for controls, as shown in Fig. 1(a).
In mid 2015, for example, while more than 75% of the channels
in the control group were active (posted their first video), only
slightly more than 50% of Alt-lite and less than 50% of Alt-right
and I.D.W. channels had done so. This growth in the communities
of interest during 2015 may also be noted in Fig. 1(i), which shows
the CDF of number comments per videos, and can also be seen
between early 2014 and late 2016 in Figs. 1(f)—(g), which show the
number of likes and views per video, respectively. Notice that the
number of likes and views is obtained during data collection, and
thus, it might be that older videos from those channels became
popular later. Altogether, our data corroborates with the narrative
that these communities gained traction in (and fortified) Donald
Trump’s campaign during the 2016 presidential elections [2, 12].
Engagement. A key difference between the communities of inter-
est and the control channels is the level of engagement with the
videos, as portrayed by the number of likes per video, comments
per video and comments per view, shown in Figs. 1 (f), (i), and
(j), respectively. For all these metrics, the communities of interest
have more engagement than the control channels: Although control
channels have more views per video, as shown in Figs. 1(g), these
views are less often converted into likes and comments. Notably,
Alt-right channels have, since 2017, become the ones with the high-
est number of comments per view, with nearly 1 comment per 5
views by 2018. The alignment of the high rate of comments/view
with the extremity of communities (Alt-right > Alt-lite > I.D.W. >
Control) is particularly helpful as we do have access to the entire
trajectories of comments by users.
Dormant Alt-right Channels. Although by 2013, approximately
the same number of channels of all three communities had become
active (∼ 30), as it can be seen in Fig. 1(a), the number of videos they
published by the Alt-right was very low before 2016. This can be
seen in the CCDF in Fig. 1(h): while control andAlt-lite channels had
published nearly 40% of their content, the Alt-right had published
a bit more than 20%. This is not because the most popular channels
did not yet exist: 4 out of the 5 current top Alt-right channels
(accumulating approximately 150Mviews) had already been created
by 2013. Moreover, it is noteworthy that many of the channels now
dedicated to Alt-right content have initial videos related to other
subjects. Take for example the channel “The Golden One”, number
5 in Tab. 1. Most of the initial videos in the channel are about
working out or video-games, with politics related videos becoming
increasingly occurring. The growth in engagement metrics such as
likes per video and comments per video of the Alt-right succeeds
that of the I.D.W. and of the Alt-lite, resonating with the narrative
that the rise of Alt-Lite and I.D.W. channels created fertile grounds
for individuals with fringe ideas to prosper [25, 30].
Although our data-driven analysis sheds light into existing nar-
ratives on the communities of interest, it is still impossible to de-
termine, from these simple CDFs, whether there is a radicalization
pipeline. To do so, in the following two sections, we dig deeper into
the relationship between these communities looking closely at the
users who commented on them.
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Figure 2: In (a), the number of unique commenting users per year in the top plot and the CDF of comments per user for each
one of the communities in the bottom plot. In (b)—(d) we show two similarity metrics (Jaccard and Overlap Coefficient) for
different pairs of sets of commenting users across the years. In (b) these pairs are the sets of users of each community in
subsequent years. In (c) these pairs are the sets of users of each one of the communities of interest. In (d) these pairs are the
sets of users of the communities compared with the users who commented in control channels.
5 USER INTERSECTION
We begin our in-depth analysis of users who commented in the
channels of interest by analysing the intersection between the users
in different channels and communities. In that context, we use
two set similarity metrics: the Jaccard Similarity |A∩B ||A∪B | ; and the
Overlap Coefficient |A∩B |min( |A |, |B |) . Notice that the overlap coefficient
is particularly useful to compare communities of different sizes.
For example a small subset of a large set may yield low Jaccard
Similarity, but will necessarily yield an Overlap Coefficient of 1.
Column (a) of Fig. 2 characterizes commenting users. The top plot
shows the absolute number of commenting users per year, while the
bottom one shows the CDF of the number of comments per users
per community. It is interesting to compare these plots with that of
Fig. 1(e), as we can see that the communities of interest have many
more highly active commenters. This supports the hypothesis that
users who consume content in the communities of interest are more
"engaged" than those who consume the content from the control
channels. Notice also that, although the Alt-right commenters have,
in average, fewer comments than those in Alt-lite or the I.D.W., the
community is much younger (as discussed in Sec. 4), and thus it is
hard to tell whether their users are less engaged.
In columns (b)—(d) of Fig. 2 we consider the intersection between
the commenting users of the I.D.W., the Alt-lite, the Alt-right and
control channels. The top figure for each column shows the Jaccard
Similarity and the bottom one shows the Overlap Coefficient.
Column (b) in Fig. 2 shows the similarity measures for a commu-
nity with itself a year before (which here we name self-similarity).
We find that the retention of users among the three communities
is growing with time for both metrics. However, for control chan-
nels we find that the Jaccard similarity is actually decreasing since
2015, and that the overlap coefficient only recently started to grow,
perhaps due to the sharp increase in commenting users since 2015.
Commenting users from the communities of interest seem to go
back more often than those in control.
Column (c) in Fig. 2 shows the pairwise similarity between the
three communities. Notably, the Jaccard Similarity between the
Alt-lite and the I.D.W. is higher than the self-similarity of these two
communities, reaching almost 30% over time. Moreover, the Overlap
Coefficient of the Alt-right with the Alt-lite and the Alt-right is
high: approximately 55% for the I.D.W. and 70% for the Alt-lite in
2018. This means more than half of the users who commented in
Alt-right channels commented in the other communities.
Lastly, column (d) in Fig. 2 shows the similarity of the three com-
munities with the control channels. We have that the Jaccard simi-
larity between the I.D.W. and the Alt-lite and the control channels
is not so different from the similarity between these communities
and the Alt-right. This is a subtle finding. On one hand, it means
that individuals in these communities make up a significant portion
of the massive media channels we use for control, which gather
billions of views. These communities do not exist in a vacuum,
but are part of the existing online information environment. On
the other, it shows that the Alt-right, a group of channels with
order of magnitudes fewer views, subscribers and comments, are
actually on par with these large channels. Inspecting the Overlap
Coefficient, however, we get a different view: there we have that the
communities overlap more with themselves than with the control
channels. Interestingly, for both similarity measurements we can
see a sharp growth in the similarity with control after 2016. This
may be explained due to the sharp increase in popularity of these
communities since 2015, as discussed in Sec. 4.
These analyses take us one step further in understanding the
communities being studied. We again see that their users are more
engaged, and, notably, find that the I.D.W, the Alt-lite, and the
Alt-right increasingly share the same commenting user base.
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Figure 3: We show how users "migrate" towards Alt-right content. For users who consumed only videos in the communities
indicated by the labels in the rows (Alt-lite or I.D.W., only Alt-lite, only I.D.W., and Control), we show the probability of them
consuming Alt-right content. We consider three levels of "infection": light (commented in 1 to 2 Alt-right videos), mild (3 to
5) and severe (6+). Each column tracks users in a different starting date. Initially, their infection rates are 0 (as they did not
consume any Alt-right content). As time passes, we show the infection rates in the y-axis, for each of the years, in the x-axis.
6 USER MIGRATION
In the previous section we showed that the commenting user bases
among the I.D.W., the Alt-lite, and the Alt-right are increasingly
similar —and the effect is stronger than for control channels. This
indicates that there is a growing percentage of users consuming ex-
treme (Alt-right) content on YouTube while also consuming content
from other milder communities (Alt-lite/I.D.W.). Yet, it does not, per
se, indicate that there is a radicalization pipeline in the website. It
could be, for example, that new users who join the website go on to
consume content from all three communities. To better address this
question, we find users who did not comment in Alt-right content
in a given year and track their subsequent activity. Notice that we
do not have the user’s entire activity history, and thus, we track
their activity only in the channels whose videos we collected.
For four time brackets [(2006−2012), (2013−2015), (2016), (2017)]
we track four sets of users: those who only commented in videos
of the Alt-lite or the I.D.W, those who did so only for videos in
the Alt-lite, those who did so only for videos in the I.D.W., and
those who commented only in videos of the control channels. Then,
for subsequent years, we track the same users. Notice that when
users are tracked for one year they are not eligible for selection in
upcoming years. We consider these users to be "infected" if they
commented in 1-2 (light), 3-5 (mild) or 6+ (severe) Alt-right videos.
The results for this analysis are shown in Fig. 3. We show the
percentage of users we managed to track that became infected. The
number of users tracked and infected at each step may be found
in Appendix C. Consider, for example, users who in 2006 − 2012
commented only on I.D.W. or Alt-lite content (227, 945 users), as
shown in the subplot in the first column and the first row. By 2018,
around 10%were lightly infected, and roughly 4% severely or mildly
so —which amounts to more than 9k users in total. From the ones
who in 2017 commented only in Alt-lite or I.D.W. videos (1, 253, 751
users), as shown in the last column of the first row, approximately
12% of them became infected —more than 60k users altogether.
We also find that control channels present lower infection rates,
as can be seen comparing the first and last row of the figure. The
difference is particularly significant for the last three time brackets.
Less than 1% of users in control became mildly or severely infected,
while 3% to 4% of Alt-lite or I.D.W. users did so. Moreover, while
in control around 4% of users eventually became lightly infected,
more than 8% of Alt-lite or I.D.W users did so.
When teasing apart users that commented only on Alt-lite or
only on I.D.W. content, we find that, not only users who commented
only on content from the I.D.W. get less infected, but increasingly
less so, as with the control channels. For example, the radicalization
rates of users who watched only Alt-lite (second row) or only I.D.W.
(third row) content are much more similar for those tracked in
2006 − 2012 (first column) than for those tracked in 2017 (last
column). For users who were tracked in 2006 − 2012, around 15%
became infected for both scenarios, while for those tracked in 2017,
this difference grew farther apart (∼ 12% Alt-lite vs. ∼ 6% I.D.W.).
The previous study suggests that the pipeline effect does exist,
and that indeed, users systematically go frommilder communities to
the Alt-right. However, it does not give insight into how expressive
the effect is in terms of what part of the Alt-right user base has
gone through it. We address this question by tracking users exactly
as we did before, and then analyzing what percentage of "infected"
users at each year can be traced back to users who initially watched
content from other communities. In other terms, for each year we
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Figure 4: We show how expressive the tracked users are in terms of the Alt-right user base. Each row shows a the a different
condition for tracking users and each column shows a different level of infection. Each line corresponds to users tracked at a
different starting date (in the x-axis), and the y-axis shows the percentage of the total Alt-right commenting users they went
to become (notice that all lines begin at 0, because initially they did not consume any Alt-right content).
calculate, of the users who are infected (i.e. who watched Alt-right
videos), which percentage belongs to each one of the sets of tracked
users we just described.
The results for this analysis are shown in Fig. 4. We find that
these users are a considerable fraction of the Alt-right comment-
ing audience. In 2018, for all kinds of infections, roughly 40% of
commenting users can be traced back from cohorts of users that
commented only in Alt-lite or I.D.W. videos in the past. This can be
seen in the first row of the plot. Moreover, we can observe that, con-
sistently, users who consumed Alt-lite or I.D.W. content in a given
year, go on to become a significant fraction of the Alt-right user
base in the following year. This number is much more expressive
than the number of users which came from control channels —in
the last row— which never surpasses 6% for all levels of infection.
Looking at the second and third row of Fig. 4, we find a sub-
stantial difference between the I.D.W. and the Alt-lite. Whereas in
Sec. 5 we find that the intersection between them both and the
Alt-right are very similar, here we see that users who initially com-
mented only on I.D.W. channels constitute a much less significant
percentage of the Alt-right consumer base in upcoming years. For
all levels of infection, at all times, the number of infected users that
can be traced back to commenting exclusively on I.D.W. channels
is around 3 times lower. So, while in 2018, 23.3% of users who were
lightly infected can be traced back to users who commented in
Alt-lite channels in previous years, only 7.6% can be traced back
to I.D.W. channels. Overall, in both analyses, users who consumed
only I.D.W. channel seem to behave more similarly to the users in
the control group. Yet, as we see in Sec. 5, the intersection between
the Alt-lite and the I.D.W. is increasing with time, which means this
population is becoming less significant.
The experiments performed show that, not only the commenting
user bases are becoming increasingly similar (as shown in Sec. 5),
but that, systematically, users who commented only in I.D.W. or
Alt-lite content go on to comment on Alt-right channels. This phe-
nomenon is significant both in terms of the percentage of the users
tracked —as in Fig. 3— and in terms of the total Alt-right comment-
ing user base —as in Fig. 4.
7 THE RECOMMENDATION ALGORITHM
In this section, we inspect the impact of YouTube’s recommendation
algorithm. Unfortunately, we have only a snapshot of the recom-
mender system which does not take into account personalization.
Thus, it is hard to reach significant conclusions on what was the
role of the recommender system in the radicalization process we
depicted in Sec. 6. Yet, we argue that analyzing these data is rele-
vant, for it is a blueprint of how the influence of the recommender
system may be measured, and because it allows us to understand
how the recommender system is behaving for our scenario.
Table 3: Percentage of edges in-between communities in
the recommendation graphs (normalized per weight). Video
recommendations are in bold. Rows indicate the source of
edges columns indicate their destination.
Src|Dst I.D.W. Alt-lite Alt-right Control Other
I.D.W. 53.74/19.07 19.72/1.59 0.37/0.03 2.99/3.02 23.18/76.29
Alt-L 20.68/2.43 47.93/12.52 3.08/0.13 2.84/3.27 25.47/81.65
Alt-R 13.01/1.89 39.03/1.15 25.83/8.55 1.36/3.38 20.78/85.03
Control 5.00/0.31 4.41/0.08 0/0 29.12/14.84 61.47/84.77
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Figure 5: We show the results for the simulation of random walks for channels (a) and videos (b). We show two metrics, as
described in the text, the probability of the walker being in a given community at each step (solid line) and the reachability at
each step for a given community (dashed line). The different columns portray different starting rules for the initial node in
the simulations. Error bands are 95% confidence intervals.
We perform our analysis in a recommendation graph, built using
the data collected. The graph is built as follows: for each channel,
we join together all recommendations obtained in all rounds of
data collection. Each channel is a node, and edges between nodes
indicate recommendations from a channel to another (for both
video and channel recommendations). Notice that, in case there
was a recommendation towards a channel or a video we are not
aware of, we add an edge to a special sink node we name "Other".
Each edge is weighted proportionally to the number of times that
recommendation appeared in the data collection, and weights are
normalized so that outcoming edges of each node sum up to 1.
The percentage of edges flowing from each community to an-
other (normalized by their weight) is shown in Tab. 3 for channel
and video recommendations. For channel recommendations, we
have that control channels are recommended scarcely by the com-
munities of interest. In fact, there are more edges flowing out of
control channels towards Alt-lite and I.D.W. channels than the other
way around. Alt-lite and I.D.W. channels recommend channels from
the same community around 50% of the time, and recommend each
other around 20% of the time. Alt-right channels are not often rec-
ommended, but significantly more so than by the Alt-lite (3.08%),
than by the I.D.W. (0.37%). For video recommendations, there is a
high prevalence of recommendation to videos we were not able
to track (more than 75% of outgoing edges from all communities
pointed towards the "Other" node). We also find that control chan-
nels are more often recommended in this setting (around 3% for all
other communities), and that the Alt-lite and the I.D.W. recommend
each other roughly 2% of the time. Lastly, it is noteworthy that
Alt-right videos are not significantly recommended here.
Given these graphs, we perform experiments considering a ran-
dom walker. The random walker begins in a random node, chosen
with chance proportional to the number of subscribers in each
channel. Then, the random walker randomly navigates the graph
for 5 steps, choosing edges at random with probabilities propor-
tional to their weights. We store the random walks and calculate
two metrics. The first is the probability of it being in a channel
from each of the communities, that is, the probability that there is
channel of a given community in the k-th step. The second is the
reachability of each of the communities at step k . That is, at step k ,
the percentage of times that the random walker has found a node
of a given community. We run the simulation 10, 000 times for four
starting scenarios. In each scenario, the initial node is restricted to
one of the three communities or the control channels.
Importantly, we consider a small difference in the experimental
set-up for each of the graphs. In the channel recommendation graph,
we allow the random walker to choose the "Other" node. When
this happens the walk stops, thus at each step there is a probability
this walk is interrupted by this —or by the fact that there are no
recommended channels. In the channel recommendation graph, as
the number of edges to the "Other" node is too high, we do not
allow the random walker to go towards it. Notice that the scenario
for the channels is more realistic, and we give more weight to the
conclusions drawn there. The two aforementioned metrics, at each
step, given different starting conditions, are shown on Fig. 5, for
channel and video recommendations.
For channel recommendations, we have that the reachability@5
of Alt-right channels is of approximately 4% for the simulations
starting from Alt-lite and I.D.W. channels. Moreover, starting from
an I.D.W. channel, users have approximately 10% of chance of being
in an Alt-lite channel at the next step, and in 5 steps, there is 25% of
chance that the user has found at least one Alt-lite channel. Starting
from the Control channels, reachability@5 of I.D.W. channels is of
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2.5%, and of slightly less than 1% for Alt-lite channels. These can
be seen on the bottom row of Fig. 5 (a).
For video recommendations, reaching Alt-right channels from
other communities is less likely. From the Alt-lite, reachability@5
is of around 0.06%. Going from the I.D.W. to the Alt-lite is more dif-
ficult: the reachability@5 is of roughly 10%. More relevant, though,
starting from control channels, the reachability@5 of I.D.W. and
Alt-lite channels is of around 4.5% and 1.5% respectively. It is worth
recalling that this experiment is less realistic than the former, as
here we ignore the possibility of the random walker being in a
video we are not aware of.
Overall, we find that, particularly in the channel recommender
system, it is easy to navigate from the I.D.W. to the Alt-lite (and
vice-versa), and it is possible to find Alt-right channels. If we follow
the recommender system 5 times, approximately 1 out of each
25 times we will have spotted an Alt-right channel. In the video
recommender system, Alt-right channels are less recommended,
but finding Alt-lite channels from the I.D.W. and I.D.W. channels
from the large media channels in the control group is also feasible.
Considering the sheer amount of views the channels in the Alt-lite,
the I.D.W. and the Alt-lite, these percentages, although low, may
result in a very significant number of views towards fringe content.
This process may also be amplified when taking personalization
into account. Notice that we depict the two graphs in which we
performed our experiments in Appendix E.
8 DISCUSSION
We performed a throughout analysis of three YouTube communi-
ties —the I.D.W., the Alt-lite, and the Alt-right— inspecting a large
dataset with millions of comments and recommendations from
thousands of videos. In this section, we discuss how the insights of
our analyses shed light into our research questions. We also talk
about the limitations and potential implications of this work.
RQ1.Howwas the growth of these communities on YouTube
in the last decade?The three communities studied sky-rocketed in
terms of views, likes, videos published and comments, particularly,
since 2015, coinciding with the turbulent presidential election of
that year, as shown in Sec. 4. However, this seems to be the case not
for these communities, but also for the larger channels in the control
group. A difference between the communities and control channels
lays in the engagement of their users. The number of comments per
view seems to be particularly high for extreme content (Sec. 4), and
users in all three communities are more assiduous commentators
than in the control group (Sec. 5).
RQ2. To which extent do users systematically gravitate to-
wardsmore extreme content?We find that the commenting user
bases for the three communities are increasingly similar (Sec. 5), and,
considering Alt-right channels as a proxy for extreme content, that
a significant amount of commenting users systematically migrates
from commenting exclusively on milder content to commenting on
more extreme content (Sec. 7). We argue that this finding comprises
significant evidence that there has been, and there continues to be,
user radicalization on YouTube, and our analyses of the activity
of these communities (Sec. 4) is consistent with the theory that
more extreme content "piggybacked" the surge in popularity of
I.D.W. and Alt-lite content [30]. We show this migration phenom-
enon is not only consistent throughout the years, but also that
it is significant in its absolute quantity. Noticeably, the findings
related to this research question make the implicit assumption that
commenting users are a good enough proxy for radicalization, and
that comments in YouTube channels are supportive of the videos
they are associated with. We find these to be minor issues. First,
the sheer amount of comments and high prevalence of comments
per views in Alt-right videos suggest that commenting users are a
population worth studying, specially when in Sec. 4 we found that
more Alt-right channels had a very high percentage of comments
per view. Secondly, during the three week annotation period, it was
noted that the number of opposing comments is rather small. We
went as far as to manually check 900 randomly selected comments
(300 for each community of interest), and found that only 5 could be
interpreted as criticisms to the videos they were associated with. As
identifying stance in short comments is a difficult research question
on its own, we considered that commenting was a good enough
proxy for our work.
RQ3. Do algorithmic recommendations steer users towards
more extreme content? Our simulations suggest that YouTube’s
recommendation algorithms frequently suggest Alt-lite and I.D.W.
content. From these two communities, it is possible to find Alt-right
content from recommended channels, but not from recommended
videos. Noticeably, our analysis has several shortcomings which
do not allow us to make bold claims about this research question.
Firstly, we are able to look only at a tiny fraction of actual rec-
ommendations —it could very well be that this content was being
promoted in the past. Secondly, our analysis does not take into
account personalization, which could reveal a completely different
picture. Still, even without personalization, and after continuous
backlash against YouTube in the last years, we were still able to
find a path in which users could find extreme content from large
media channels.
Implications. Our work resonates with the narrative that there is
a radicalization pipeline [37, 42]. Indeed, we manage to measure
traces of this phenomenon using commenting users. Yet, given that
it is not possible to know how YouTube’s recommender system
worked in the past, and given that we did not take into personal-
ization into account, our work is not able to determine the extent
to which the recommender system played a role in this process.
Regardless, we argue that (i) our analysis of the recommender sys-
tem does show that this is indeed feasible, even in our simplistic
scenario, and (ii) regardless of the role of the recommender system,
user radicalization on YouTube seems to be significant.
Future Work. In this paper, we focused exclusively on basic sta-
tistics (likes, views and comments) and on the trajectory of users,
be they inferred through comments or simulated in the recom-
mendation graphs. Another interesting direction would be to trace
the evolution of the speech of content creators and commenting
users throughout the years: what are the narratives that arose, how
did their tone change. Moreover, we intend to extend the exist-
ing framework to audit radicalization to take into account user
personalization —this is not trivial, as knowing the trajectories of
radicalized users through YouTube content is hard.
Auditing Radicalization Pathways on YouTube
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Figure 6: Recommendation graph of YouTube channels.
Figure 7: Recommendation graph of YouTube videos. Colors
for communities are the same as those in the paper.
A DATA COLLECTION
We give some details in the data collection process. Tab. 6 and
Tab. 7 show for channels labeled as Alt-right, Alt-lite and I.D.W.,
their communities and data collection steps. Tab 8 shows all con-
trol channels we obtained. Fig. 9 highlights what was collected on
YouTube. Below, we enumerate the keywords employed to search
for channels of each of the communities:
Figure 8: Example of YouTube channel with featured chan-
nel on the side.
For the I.D.W. Stephen Hicks, Camille Paglia, Carl Benjamin, Elon
Musk, Akira the Don, Nicholas Christakis, Claire Lehmann, Matt
Christiansen, Steven Pinker, RebelWisdom, Tim Pool, Quillette, Jonathan
Haidt, Peter Thiel, Lindsay Shepherd, James Damore
For the Alt-lite Brittany Pettibone, Jack Posobiec, Gavin McInnes,
Kyle Chapman, Kyle Prescott, Lucian Wintrich, Mike Cernovich, Milo
Yiannopoulos, Stefan Molyneaux, Vee, Blonde in the Belly of the Beast,
Paul Joseph Watson, Styxhenxenhammer666, Rebel Media, Lauren
Chen, Computing Forever, Andy Warski, Owen Benjamin, Steven
Crowder
For the Alt-right Evola, Evropa, The Jewish Question, White Geno-
cide, Mass immigration, Andrew Anglin, weev, Andy Nowicki, Au-
gustus Invictus, Christopher Cantwell, Collin Liddell, Daniel J. Kleve,
Daniel Friberg, Dillon Irizarry, Greg Johnson, Jared Taylor, Jason
Kessler, Jason Reza Jorjani, Johnny Monoxide, Lana Lokteff, Matt
Forney, Matthew Heimbach, Matthew Parrott, Mike Enoch, Nathan
Damigo, Pax Dickinson, Richard Spencer, Tara McCarthy, Vox Day,
Baked Alaska
B FEATURED VS RECOMMENDED
We illustrate the difference between featured and recommended
channel. In Fig. 8 you may see an example of featured channels,
these are chosen by the channel owner. In Fig. 9, letter (e) shows
related channels, these are recommendations made by YouTube.
C LIKES, VIDEOS, VIEWS, COMMENTS
Tab. 4 shows, for the three communities, the number of likes, views,
videos and commenting users accross the years.
D USER TRAJECTORIES
Tab. 5 shows the absolute numbers of users tracked and infected
(at all levels, as mentioned in Sec. 6. It also shows what percentage
of the total number of users who watched Alt-right the number of
users infected was.
E RECOMMENDATION GRAPHS
In Figs. 6 and 7 we show the recommendation graphs used for the
experiment in Section 7.
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Table 4: For all categories, we list the number of likes, views, videos and commenting users across the years.
Category Year Like Count View Count Video Count Comment Count
Alt-lite 2008 272639 18145720 1392 129130
2009 585060 32993863 929 197934
2010 503744 30519109 1498 248432
2011 527221 28400257 2344 236961
2012 805166 61779929 4142 360688
2013 1227089 100673417 2468 529538
2014 1973844 137877955 3375 608113
2015 6561782 352751031 7132 2041333
2016 24384665 931704328 9324 7982815
2017 51764529 1330158802 15927 11502964
2018 52323713 1051654691 20784 20513250
Alt-right 2008 559 73159 29 332
2009 8389 1236895 313 1135
2010 14124 1897892 363 2136
2011 15992 1778120 174 6076
2012 75092 4925868 434 10452
2013 160494 11219639 654 25825
2014 233381 12718956 725 47032
2015 434925 17148672 958 127319
2016 1411778 44177307 2334 529821
2017 4253888 108482909 3548 1262549
2018 5773031 106455102 5843 2725573
Control 2008 348137 128986765 2115 7932
2009 511468 196992273 3939 41492
2010 573299 203399250 6531 94379
2011 1824078 350120542 12748 200385
2012 3432239 454969357 25716 447302
2013 5238196 716009326 18135 756691
2014 9217725 1538251895 18836 814124
2015 16569182 2015671151 24168 830655
2016 27807514 2481994316 30119 1317648
2017 46467022 3102590498 35678 2931209
2018 54106314 2997876294 30951 13667470
I.D.W. 2008 54185 7034287 447 5263
2009 61340 8661426 488 11249
2010 135205 15457288 549 29932
2011 269021 22797055 884 129453
2012 365241 23918023 1067 154322
2013 1095128 109814034 2528 229144
2014 3072296 256213378 2504 588068
2015 4975362 310760188 2324 1610366
2016 9515078 518317670 3497 3062565
2017 22103578 1201736706 8954 5133976
2018 28079111 1620909482 14981 11904865
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Table 5: We show absolute numbers for users infected and tracked in Sec. 6, as well as what percentage of the total number of
users who watched Alt-right the number of users infected was.
Category Start Year Number of Users Infected Number of Users Tracked Percentage of Users Alt-right
Alt-lite 2006-2012 2006-2012 0 170301 0.0%
2013-2015 2133 43895 14.07%
2016 3426 27052 8.83%
2017 4557 28960 6.11%
2018 6186 34447 4.37%
2013-2015 2013-2015 0 417113 0.0%
2016 12319 128093 25.84%
2017 16402 117689 19.76%
2018 22819 127464 15.43%
2016 2016 0 719232 0.0%
2017 31308 301559 32.2%
2018 45017 291136 28.41%
2017 2017 0 779316 0.0%
2018 44117 354039 25.27%
Alt-lite or I.D.W. 2006-2012 2006-2012 0 227945 0.0%
2013-2015 3194 64913 21.05%
2016 5016 39539 13.02%
2017 6644 42158 8.94%
2018 8896 49766 6.29%
2013-2015 2013-2015 0 696899 0.0%
2016 25881 253479 57.8%
2017 33586 230700 41.96%
2018 42691 239787 29.32%
2016 2016 0 1041550 0.0%
2017 52621 480584 57.1%
2018 70906 455166 45.91%
2017 2017 0 1253751 0.0%
2018 74622 620581 44.14%
Control 2006-2012 2006-2012 0 248214 0.0%
2013-2015 1136 50753 7.0%
2016 2331 27175 5.3%
2017 3122 31001 3.75%
2018 4628 41941 3.01%
2013-2015 2013-2015 0 637009 0.0%
2016 3129 81357 5.72%
2017 5150 86027 5.41%
2018 8110 116368 4.84%
2016 2016 0 365592 0.0%
2017 2928 75539 2.65%
2018 4998 92312 2.79%
2017 2017 0 696089 0.0%
2018 7792 214516 3.85%
I.D.W. 2006-2012 2006-2012 0 47914 0.0%
2013-2015 566 14961 3.54%
2016 889 8750 2.26%
2017 1240 9426 1.64%
2018 1687 11329 1.15%
2013-2015 2013-2015 0 211977 0.0%
2016 4621 72519 9.51%
2017 6729 67145 7.78%
2018 8529 70630 5.41%
2016 2016 0 232102 0.0%
2017 5937 98623 5.83%
2018 8702 97275 5.15%
2017 2017 0 419833 0.0%
2018 14241 205895 7.6%
Auditing Radicalization Pathways on YouTube
Table 6: For the three communities, we list all the websites analysed in this paper (part 1).
Alt-right channels Step Alt-lite channels Step I.D.W. channels Step
0 AltRight.com 1 America First with Nicholas J Fuentes 1 Ben Shapiro 1
1 AmRen Podcasts 1 Andy Warski 1 Bret Weinstein 1
2 AmRenVideos 1 Blonde in the Belly of the Beast 1 Gad Saad 1
3 Ayla Stewart Wife With A Purpose 1 Brittany Pettibone 1 JRE Clips 1
4 Baked Alaska 2 1 Computing Forever 1 Jordan B Peterson Clips 1
5 Black Pigeon Speaks 1 Gavin McInnes 1 JordanPetersonVideos 1
6 Bre Faucheux 1 Laura Loomer 1 Lindsay Shepherd 1
7 CounterCurrentsTV 1 Lauren Chen 1 Matt Christiansen 1
8 Darkstream 1 Lauren Southern 1 Owen Benjamin 1
9 Faith J Goldy 1 MILO 1 Owen Benjamin Clips 1
10 James Allsup 1 Mike Cernovich 1 PowerfulJRE 1
11 Jason Kessler 1 Nick Fuentes Clips 1 Rebel Wisdom 1
12 Jean-François Gariépy 1 No Bullshit 1 Sam Harris 1
13 Johnny Monoxide 1 No Bullshit 2 1 SargonofAkkad100 1
14 MW Live 1 Paul Joseph Watson 1 The Rubin Report 1
15 Matt Forney 1 Rebel Canada 1 joerogandotnet 1
16 MillennialWoes 1 Rebel Edge 1 1791 2
17 NPI / Radix 1 Rebel Media 1 American Justice 2
18 Red Ice TV 1 Stefan Molyneux 1 Atheist Foundation of Australia Inc 2
19 Staying Woke 1 StevenCrowder 1 AynRandInstitute 2
20 The Golden One 1 Styxhexenhammer666 1 Ben Shapiro Thug Life 2
21 The Reality Calls Show 1 The Thinkery 1 Benjamin A Boyce 2
22 Traditionalist Worker Party 1 Vee 1 Brother Nathanael 2
23 Voxiversity 1 6oodfella 2 CISAus 2
24 augustussolinvictus 1 A1Cvenom 2 Clash of Ideas 2
25 iambakedalaska 1 AIU-Resurrection 2 Conversations with Bill Kristol 2
26 Alt Right 2 AltRight Truth 2 Crysta 2
27 Alt-Right Tankie 2 AustralianNeoCon1 2 Desi-Rae Thinking 2
28 American Pride 2 BlazeTV 2 Douglas Murray Archive 2
29 American Pride 2 2 Brave New World 2 Enlightainment 2
30 ArktosOnline 2 Bull Brand 2 Essential Truth 2
31 Augustus Invictus for United States Senate 2 Carpe Donktum 2 Freedom Speaks 2
32 AustralianRealist 2 Christopher Anderson 2 Glenn Beck 2
33 Be Open MInded 2 Daily Caller 2 Gravitahn 2
34 BigCatKayla Livestreams 2 DailyCallerVideo 2 Informative 2
35 Charles Zeiger 2 DailyKenn 2 Jordan Peterson Fan Channel 2
36 Corpus Mentis 2 Dinesh D’Souza 2 Liberty us 2
37 Dismantle The Matrix 2 DoctorRandomercam 2 MG 2
38 Dissident View 2 Domination Station 2 Maximilien Robespierre 2
39 Engländer 2 Harrison Hill Smith 2 MeaningofLife.tv 2
40 Jan Kerkoff 2 Jacob Wohl 2 Mike Nayna 2
41 Mark Collett 2 Kelly Day 2 Motte & Bailey 2
42 Matthew North 2 Leo Stratton 2 MrAndsn 2
43 Nacionalista Blanco del SoCal 2 Liberty Machine News 2 Notes For Space Cadets 2
44 Nationalist Media Network 2 Luke Ford 2 Pangburn 2
45 No White Guilt 2 Luke Ford Livestreams 2 PhilosophyInsights 2
46 Patrick Slattery 2 Make Cringe Great Again 2 Pragmatic Entertainment 2
47 Real McGoy 2 News2Share 2 ReasonTV 2
48 Revcon Media 2 On The Offensive 2 Savage Facts 2
49 Stand Up Europe 2 Oppressed Media 2 The Daily Truth 2
50 Steve Trueblue 2 Revenge Of The Cis 2 The Free Speech Club 2
51 The Alternative Hypothesis 2 RobinHoodUKIP 2 The Heritage Foundation 2
52 The Great Dolemite 2 SJW CRINGE MACHINE 2 The New Criterion 2
53 The James Delingpole Channel 2 SJWCentral 2 The Pondering Primate 2
54 The Last Stand 2 Semiogogue 2 The Unplugged Observer 2
55 The Rational Rise 2 Social Justice Fails 2 TheArchangel911 2
56 TheArmenianNation 2 The Fallen State 2 TheAtlasSociety 2
57 This is Europa 2 The Glass Blind Spot 2 Transliminal 2
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Table 7: For the three communities, we list all the websites analysed in this paper (part 2).
Alt-right channels Step Alt-lite channels Step I.D.W. channels Step
58 ThuleanPerspective 2 The Hateful Gaels 2 Trigger Happy Media 2
59 Traditionalist Youth Network 2 The Iconoclast 2 VikNand 2
60 Truth Against The World 2 TheSchillingShow 2 Washington Watch 2
61 WhiteRabbitRadioTV 2 Tipping Point With Liz Wheeler on OAN 2 WisdomTalks 2
62 andy nowicki 2 Tommy Robinson 2 YAFTV 2
63 eliharman 2 Tree Of Logic 2 ZIEeICoZ 2
64 jackburton2009 2 UNITE AMERICA FIRST 2 ZeroFox Given 2
65 nightmarefuel 2 Western Man 2 battleofideas 2
66 14 Sacred Words 3 Zach Hing 2 bloggingheads.tv 2
67 Awakened Saxon 3 grapjas60 2 bmdavll 2
68 Borzoi Boskovic 3 hOrnsticles3 2 successcouncil 2
69 Danny 1488 3 ramzpaul 2 tmcleanful 2
70 InvincibleNumanist 3 theovonk 2 wikileaksplus 2
71 LaughingMan0X 3 theturningpointusa 2 xUnlimitedMagz 2
72 Laura Towler 3 thkelly67 2 ybrook 2
73 LibertarianRealist2 3 Actual Justice Warrior 3 AgatanFoundation 3
74 Little Revolution 3 AllNationsParty 3 Bite-sized Philosophy 3
75 Marie Cachet 3 Alt Hype Streams 3 CoolHardLogic 3
76 Morrakiu 3 Aydin Paladin 3 Davie Addison 3
77 NeatoBurrito Productions 3 Beacom Of Light 3 Dose of Truth 3
78 NewEuropeANP 3 Bearing 3 DronetekPolitics 3
79 OnlineWipe 3 Count Dankula 3 Galactic Bubble Productions 3
80 Oswald Spengler 3 Dangerfield 3 HowTheWorldWorks 3
81 Prince of Zimbabwe 3 Demirep 3 ManOfAllCreation 3
82 Serp Kerp 3 Dr. Steve Turley 3 PragerUniversity 3
83 TRS Radio 3 IRmep Stream 3 Rekt Idiots 3
84 The Leftovers 3 Jericho Green 3 Sinatra_Says 3
85 The Lion 3 John Ward 3 Sorting Myself Out 3
86 The Revolutionary Conservative 3 JustInformed Talk 3 The Andrew Klavan Show 3
87 VertigoPolitix 3 Liberty Hangout 3 The Daily Wire 3
88 MR. OBVIOUS 3 The Heartland Institute 3
89 MarkDice 3 The Propertarian Institute 3
90 MichelleRempel 3 Timcast 3
91 Mister Metokur 3
92 NateTalksToYou 3
93 OneTruth4Life 3
94 ProductiehuisEU 3
95 Reverend Simon Sideways 3
96 Sanity 4 Sweden 3
97 Sargon of Akkad Live 3
98 SkidRowRadio 3
99 Slightly Offens*ve 3
100 Tea Clips 3
101 The Amazing Lucas 3
102 The Weekly Sweat 3
103 TheBechtloff 3
104 TheIncredibleSaltMine 3
105 Toad McKinley 3
106 TokenLibertarianGirl 3
107 Undoomed 3
108 Vincent James of The Red Elephants 3
109 ataxin 3
110 brianoflondon 3
111 jaydyer 3
112 libertydollshouse 3
113 patcondell 3
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Table 8: Control communities
Left Center Left-Center Right-Center Right
0 cosmopolitan big think (the)atlantic forbes american enterprise institute
1 democracy now c-span business insider gulf news judicial watch
2 elite daily consumer reports cbc news learn liberty national rifle association (nra)
3 good magazine financial times engadget new york post pj media
4 gq magazine harvard business review feminist frequency ntd.tv (new tang dynasty) project veritas
5 huffington post (huffpost) investopedia glamour magazine russia insider ron paul liberty report
6 mashable makeuseof global citizen
7 merry jane mental floss global news
8 new york magazine military.com hollywood reporter
9 new yorker recode la times
10 people magazine relevant magazine lifehacker
11 slate the economist new york daily news
12 uproxx the indian express rolling stone
13 upworthy today i found out san francisco globe
14 vanity fair vocativ scoopwhoop
15 vox world economic forum scroll.in
16 sky news
17 techcrunch
18 the guardian
19 the verge
20 vice news
21 washington post
22 wired magazine
23 yahoo news
Horta Ribeiro et al.
(d)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(e)
(f)
Figure 9: Overview of the elements we collected: (a) video captions, when available, (b) video recommendations, (c) video
description and metadata, (d) comments, (e) channel recommendations, and (f) video metadata.
